We examine the relationship between government size and economic growth, controlling for economic freedom and globalization, and using Bayesian Averaging over Classical Estimates in a panel of rich countries.
INTRODUCTION
The debate on the relationship between government size and economic development has been going on intensively for decades. While scholars such as Lindert (2004) and Madrick (2008) argue that the welfare state is a "free lunch" (Lindert) and that research supports a "case for big government" (the title of Madrick's book), most studies published in economics journals tend to find a negative correlation between government size and growth in rich countries. The causal interpretation, however, remains highly debated.
The conflicting results reflect different methodological choices regarding what countries to include (rich, poor, or both), how to measure government size (taxes, expenditures, or something else), and how to measure economic performance (growth, income levels, or something else). Restricting the focus to panel studies of rich countries examining the relationship between aggregate government size (measured as total tax revenue or total expenditures as a share of GDP) and growth leaves us with only a few studies, such as those by Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) , Agell et al. (2006) , and Fölster and Henrekson (2001) .
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) study 15 EU countries over the period and find a negative relationship between growth and both public consumption and total government revenue. Similarly, Fölster and Henrekson (2001) analyze a sample of rich countries over the 1970-1995 period and find a fairly robust negative correlation between growth and total government expenditures and a slightly less robust negative correlation between growth and total tax revenue (both measured as GDP shares). These results were, however, questioned by Agell et al. (2006) . The conclusion of the debate is that the correlation may be less robust when only OECD countries are included, and that the direction of causality is difficult to establish using instrumental variables.
Our paper contributes in several ways. First, we note that none of the studies mentioned above controls for any measure of institutional quality, and there is strong reason to suspect that this affected the results. With the data used by Fölster and Henrekson (2001) , we examine how the results change when we add the 2008 versions of the Economic Freedom Index from the Fraser Institute and the Globalization index from the KOF Institute to the regressions.
Second, instead of running a few regressions with selected control variables to examine the robustness of our results, we use the Bayesian averaging over classical estimates (BACE) algorithm (developed by Doppelhofer et al. 2004 ) to run all possible combinations of the 17 variables used by Fölster and Henrekson (2001) and four sub-dimensions of the Economic Freedom Index.
Finally, we examine how the results change when we update the dataset and add new data covering the 1970-2005 period.
Our results indicate that the negative effect of taxes on growth during the 1970-1995 period is highly robust and at least as big as indicated by previous studies.
Expanding the sample period and updating the data strengthens the results, as government expenditures are also deemed robust by the BACE analysis.
Furthermore, we also find that freedom to trade, as measured by the Economic Freedom Index, was positively related to growth during the 1970-2005 period.
While our results do not settle the issue of causality, the analysis indicates that the negative relationship between government size and growth holds even when controlling for economic freedom and globalization. We also find support for the idea that countries with big government can use economic openness to mitigate the negative growth effects of taxes and public expenditures.
Why and how to control for economic freedom and globalization when analyzing growth
The most basic theoretical reason for expecting taxes to have a negative effect on economic development is that transactions that would take place without taxation might not take place when buyers or sellers must also pay taxes in addition to the price agreed upon. However, from institutional economics we know that the price of a good or a service (with or without taxes) is only part of the total cost of a transaction. Other transactions costs include the costs of buyers and sellers finding each other, reaching agreement, mutually and credibly assuring each other that they will in fact uphold the agreement, and possibly also agreeing on how to resolve potential disputes. Well-defined property rights, a functioning legal system, and a stable currency are factors that lower transaction costs drastically.
Such institutional qualities are often collectively referred to as economic freedom.
In countries where high-tax wedges dampen economic activity, it is crucial that institutions minimize non-monetary transaction costs. As recently noted by Dixit (2009), the effect of government inefficiency is similar to that of taxes. Similarly, Iversen (2005, p. 74) proposed that high-tax countries in particular benefit from economic openness: … labor-intensive, low-productivity jobs do not thrive in the context of high social protection and intensive labor-market regulation, and without international trade countries cannot specialize in high value-added services.
Lack of international trade and competition, therefore, not the growth of these, is the cause of current employment problems in high-protection countries.
According to this view, the negative effects of high welfare transfers and tax wedges can at least be somewhat compensated for by economic openness, because openness allows welfare states to specialize in high value-added services.
Recently, the amount of available empirical evidence on the economic consequences of economic freedom, economic openness, and globalization has increased drastically. Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) conduct a meta-study of 52 studies dealing with the impact of economic freedom on economic growth, concluding that "economic freedom has a robust positive effect on economic growth regardless of how it is measured" (p. 68). Regarding the growth effects of economic openness and globalization, Lee Ha et al. (2004) demonstrate that economic openness has a causal positive effect of on growth.
1 Dreher (2006a) surveys the literature and presents results based on the KOF Index of Globalization (also used in this paper), finding globalization to have a positive growth effect as measured by the index.
The idea that countries with big government can use economic freedom and globalization to compensate for the growth-impeding effects of big government can be viewed as an alternative to two other well-known hypotheses about the welfare state in the globalized economy: the race to the bottom hypothesis and the compensations hypothesis. Recent empirical evidence casts doubt on both these hypotheses.
According to the race to the bottom hypothesis, increased labor and capital mobility will cause problems for big welfare states as countries compete with each other for high-quality labor and capital by lowering taxes and welfare benefitsas described by, for example, Martin and Schumann (1997) , Sinn (1997) , and Gramlich (1982) . Contrary to the hypothesis, recent empirical evidence suggests that globalization and big government are indeed compatible; see Dreher et al. (2008) , Dreher (2006b) , Castles (2004) , and Mendoza et al. (1997) . Actually, Rodrik (1998) noted that big government and economic openness are in fact positively correlated, supporting the idea that open economies develop larger welfare states in response to the volatility caused by economic openness. In addition to Rodrik (1998) , this idea can be traced back to Katzenstein (1985) , Cameron (1978) , and Lindbeck (1975) , and is known as the compensation hypothesis.
between economic openness and volatility is not there -neither theoretically nor empirically. While big government may still be a consequence of openness, there is currently no agreement on the theoretical mechanisms.
In any case, there are strong reasons for including a measure of economic openness or globalization and some measure of institutional quality when studying the effects of government size on growth. Fig. 1 If government size is less important for growth, the negative effect found in previous studies may partly be attributable the fact that OECD countries with high taxes before the 1990s reforms were countries with relatively low levels of both economic freedom and globalization. On the other hand, if government size is negatively related to growth, accounting for both economic freedom and globalization should better estimate this effect.
Before we continue with empirical testing, two more questions deserve attention.
First, why have countries with big government on average increased economic freedom and globalization more than countries with smaller government? Clearly, nothing prevents countries with less extensive welfare states from imitating these policies.
As already noted, high-tax countries had on average low levels of economic freedom and globalization in the 1970s. This partly explains why big increases have been possible. We further believe that the concept of state capacity is relevant (see Skocpol 1990) . 4 Countries high state capacity will be more effective than others in all their activities, including regulations in the 1970s and deregulations in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, the ability of Scandinavian welfare states to reform their institutions may well be related to the same factors that enable them to collect high taxes and provide a wide range of public services.
Finally, it should be noted that the literature on government size, growth, and institutions suffers from several endogeneity problems. In our study, there are two potentially big sources of error:
1. Do institutions cause growth, or is it the other way around?
2. Does government size affect growth, or is it the other way around?
The first question is related to the discussion of how economic freedom should be included in growth regressions. Using Granger causality tests, both Heckelman (2000) and Dawson (2003) (2006) , this is equivalent to including only the end-period level.
We have chosen to follow the standard approach when using panel data, which is to include the level of economic freedom at the beginning of each period. In other words, the 1970 level is used to explain average growth in [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] , and so on.
In addition to avoiding possible endogeneity problems, the use of levels rather than changes is consistent with endogenous growth theory, where policy variables rather than only reforms are assumed to affect economic growth.
The second endogeneity issue is related to the question of what measure of government size to trust the most: taxes or government expenditures. In the short run, public expenditures will rise when GDP falls, due to automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance and other transfer payments. Surely, this is no evidence that government expenditures cause low growth, but rather a typical example of reverse causality. To some extent, this is handled using five-year averages, but the bias will still be towards expecting a negative correlation between expenditures and growth.
The good news is, however, that for taxes, the bias goes in the opposite directionfor several reasons. Higher growth will increase the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, both because most countries have at least slightly progressive tax schemes, and because of the taxation of capital gains and profits. In other words, reverse causality suggests a positive correlation between taxes and growth, meaning that a negative coefficient on taxes actually provides rather strong evidence that high taxes cause lower growth. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Data
The data we use are those used in Fölster and Henrekson (2001) , which were kindly provided by the authors. To maintain comparability with this study, we keep their dataset in our main setting and examine how the results change when we add economic freedom and globalization to the analysis.
The Economic Freedom Index developed by the Fraser Institute, frequently used in economic research, consists of five dimensions: size of government; legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to exchange with foreigners; and regulation of credit, labor, and business. Using several indicators in each dimension, the five dimensions are weighted together to form a composite index, where 0 indicates the lowest and 10 the highest economic freedom.
Because government size is by definition highly correlated with taxes and public expenditures as a share of GDP, and because our idea is that countries with big government have increased their economic freedom but kept a big public sector, we construct a measure of economic freedom that is an average of dimensions 2 to 5, thus excluding government size. The KOF Index of Globalization, developed by Dreher (2006b) , aggregates several indicators of economic, political, and social globalization into a measure of total globalization, ranging from 0 to 100, higher numbers indicating more globalization. Because the two indices are highly correlated, we do not include them simultaneously in our OLS and fixed-effects regressions.
6
The Appendix contains a complete description of the data and their sources, including the two indices. Table 1 contains a summary description of our data. or total public expenditures (GEXP); both are measured as share of GDP and refer to the aggregate public sector. In many ways, our model specification should be seen as conservative. First, because investments are included, we only capture the growth effect of economic freedom and globalization if they influence total factor productivity. Furthermore,
as Dawson (1998) points out, institutions are likely to affect growth more in the long run, in which case a five-year average may be too short a period. In fact, most studies that find a growth effect of economic freedom rely on cross-country variation.
Tables 2 (using pooled OLS) and 3 (using panel regression with country and year fixed effects) show the effects of adding EFI25 and KOF to the main specification.
7 Using only central government expenditures would be misleading, because the degree of fiscal decentralization varies between countries. Together, Tables 2 and 3 show -as expected -that government size is negatively correlated with growth. This correlation holds in a pooled OLS driven by crosscountry differences, and in the fixed-effects model, where results are driven only by differences within countries over time. In general, control variables have the expected sign, but only initial income is highly significant in both the OLS and fixed-effects estimation.
In the OLS estimation, including the KOF measure of globalization does seem to strengthen the negative effect of both taxes and government expenditures. In the fixed-effects model, however, the effect of government size is remarkably stable and the indices are never significant. The regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3 including four sub-dimensions of economic freedom. The BACE algorithm and our results are described in the next section. regressions to run. Assuming that we select five variables at random to include in our regression, each variable has an inclusion probability of 5/21. Our BACE algorithm runs all 2 21 regressions and updates the probability of all possible models based on their goodness of fit (corrected for the degrees of freedom).
Panel Regressions using Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE)
Simply put, a variable increases its inclusion probability if the models including it tend to have above average goodness of fit. Each possible specification is weighted according to its informativeness, and inference is based on the weighted sum of estimates.
Formally, the outcome of the BACE approach is a posterior probability of each specification:
is the posterior probability of model M j given the dataset y,
is the prior probability assigned to model M j , T is the sample size, k j is the number of variables included in model M j , and SSE j is the sum of squared errors in model M j .
Using these outcomes, we may construct two distinct indicators of a variable's relative importance in explaining variations in growth rates. The first is the posterior inclusion probability, which is simply the sum of the probabilities ( )
for all the models, M j , that include a certain variable. If this inclusion probability is higher than the corresponding prior inclusion probability (in our example case, 5/21), the variable is considered an important determinant of economic growth according to the BACE algorithm.
The second indicator is the estimate of a certain variable conditional on its inclusion. This is directly comparable to parameter estimates from ordinary regressions. Hence, to conclude that taxes are harmful to growth, we require that TAX increases its inclusion probability and that the estimated coefficient, conditional on inclusion, has the expected sign and is of considerable magnitude.
Finally, is customary to test the robustness of BACE results by varying the model size. Therefore, we have run regressions with models including 3 and 7 variables -apart from fixed country and time effects, which are always included. In general, the different specifications do not produce qualitatively different results from those presented below. Table 4 shows the results of applying the BACE analysis to our sample. Because the variables GEXP and TAX are highly collinear, we used them in separate specifications, shown in Tables 4a (TAX) and 4b (GEXP). Five variables are robust in explaining growth according to our BACE analysis, and they all have the expected sign: savings rate (SAV), initial income (Y0), inflation (INFL), fertility (FERT), and government size as measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP (TAX). Government expenditures has a negative sign conditioned on inclusion, but its inclusion probability is lowered when confronted with data, so it is not considered robust according to the BACE analysis.
Given the effect of automatic stabilizers as discussed in the previous section, the fact that TAX increases its inclusion probability and has a higher mean coefficient than does GEXP is reassuring. 
Adding and updating data
We have updated the data to the most recent sources and also added data for the 1996-2005 period. A complete description of the sources is found in the Appendix. Table 5 shows the results of running a fixed-effects regression on the longer panel with the standard set of control variables (Y0, INV, DHUM, and DLAB). The results indicate that government size is no longer bad for growth.
TAX loses significance and is sometimes positive. GEXP is negative and significant, but as discussed before, if GEXP is negative while TAX is not, we have most likely picked up a reverse causality effect due to automatic stabilizers.
In other words, it seems possible to question the findings of Fölster and Henrekson (2001) by just adding 10 more years of data and rerunning the fixedeffects regression (or, for that matter, a pooled OLS regression, not shown here but available from the authors upon request). As the BACE analysis in Table 6 indicates, such a conclusion would be premature. Because they include updated data covering a longer period, the results in Table 6 are our preferred specification, from which a number of conclusions can be drawn:
First, the robustness of Y0, SAV, and INFL in explaining growth is confirmed.
Second, tax revenue is robustly negatively related to growth, and the coefficient is almost as large as in the 1970-1995 sample.
Third, government expenditures increases its inclusion probability, and the coefficient is larger than in the 1970-1995 sample.
Fourth, freedom to trade as measured by the Economic Freedom Index is robust in the TAX specification, and exports are robust in both specifications, supporting the view that countries can compensate for the negative growth effects of big government through economic openness. It is also possible that institutional reforms promoting economic freedom and globalization have different effects in the long and short terms. The positive effects of economic reforms may well come at a short-term cost, as in Ralph Dahrendorf's well-known "valley of tears" argument. To handle such issues, it is probably advisable to replace the 5-year average approach and instead use yearly data, and take the endogeneity problem more explicitly into account, preferably by finding good instruments for potentially endogenous variables such as the tax ratio. We leave these issues for future research. 
